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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint was filed January 17, 1979 to seek payment of 
a promissory note from general partners of the Emporium Partner-
ship to a limited partner and her husband. (Record hereinafter 
"R" 1-4). Judgment on the pleadings was entered (R 36-41) 
against Defendants, over their objections contesting various 
factual issues. (R 11, 12, 26-9, 34-5, 49-51). Two of the facts 
Defendants tried to preserve for trial were (1) whether the 
partnership agreement and Utah law precluded any judgment or 
enforcement of a judgment against the alleged general partners of 
a limited partnership in this instance (R 12, 26-9, 34-5, 49-51, 
56-7), and (2) whether an award for attorneys fees was even 
proper (R 51, 57) in view of no justification for them and 
Plaintiffs' failure to ever serve their affidavit in support of 
the fees on Defendants. (R 23, 57). 
Notification of service of that affidavit was never given to 
the Court (R 23), and Defendants never received the affidavit. (R 
57). In allowing the judgment to stand, the Court did not 
discuss the specific matters, but characterized Defendants1 
requests generally as going " . . . to questions of how the 
judgment should be enforced and priorities in connection there-
with". With respect to these matters, the Court ruled that 
Defendants could " . . . take any appropriate action when the 
judgment is sought to be enforced". (R 58, 59) 
The judgment awarded a fixed dollar amount of interest to 
apply from the date of the judgment until the judgment was paid. 
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(R 40) . It is specific in its wording, limiting interest to 
$2,180 " . . . from the date hereof until paid.11 This language 
agrees with the prayer of the Complaint (R 2) and is the same in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 36-8), all 
prepared by Plaintiffs. 
Over the years Plaintiffs never sought to amend the judg-
ment. In filing writs of execution and motions in an attempt to 
enforce the judgment, Plaintiffs falsely caused the Court to 
issue pleadings prepared by them attesting that the judgment 
allowed interest other than what is provided in the judgment, and 
that all that money was unpaid and due. (R 148-9, 158-9, 204, 
262-5). Defendants filed motions to quash these writs, claiming 
they were illegal for the reasons preserved from the beginning 
(R 58, 59); or were for unenforceable amounts. (R 206-214, 241-
249, 259-265, 282-5). 
The Court persisted in refusing to address the specific 
requests of the Defendants in denying Defendants' Motions to 
Quash execution for more than the judgment. (R 252-3, 287). The 
Court also ignored its promise that Defendants could "take any 
appropriate action" when Plaintiffs tried to enforce the judg-
ment. (R 58-9, 260). The Court refused to quash the writ by its 
Memorandum Decision November 20, 1986 (R 287) and Order December 
1, 1986. (R 290). Defendants objected to the form of the Order 
(R 292) and moved the Court under Rule 52(b) to amend and make 
additional findings (R 288, 294) to clarify this ruling, pointing 
out the limits to the judgment the Court was ignoring, and that 
2 
the judgment had never been amended. The Court refused to do 
this by claiming it was unaware of provisions in the rules 
allowing it to make additional findings (R 300) and entered its 
Order December 26, 1986. (R 301). Defendants filed a Notice of 
Appeal January 23, 1987. (R 303). 
On appeal, Defendants seek an order specifically limiting 
the amount Plaintiffs can collect to the amount provided, and 
limited, in the judgment. They also ask for an order quashing 
all execution efforts based on writs for improper amounts. 
Because in ruling on Defendants' timely Motions for Relief, the 
Court reserved to the Defendants the right to take any ap-
propriate action when Plaintiffs tried to enforce the judgment, 
Defendants also ask the Court to (1) agree that the partnership 
agreement precluded enforcement of the judgment against the 
general partners; and (2) rule that the award of attorneys fees 
was improper in any event. Defendants believe these are ap-
propriate requests because of the reservation made to Defendants 
(R 58, 59) by the District Court when it refused to address these 
specific issues raised immediately after the judgment. There was 
no limit on time to raise these matters again after the Court's 
ruling, which allowed them all to be raised when Plaintiffs 
1 
sought to enforce their judgment. \ 
/ These additional requests for relief: to rule on Plain-
tiffs' right to the judgment in the first place, to set aside a 
portion of it, and to grant relief - otherwise would be made too 
late under Rules 59 and 60(b). However, the Court chose to 
reserve these rights to Defendants for reasons best known to 
itself but relied on by Defendants. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This matter is before the Court on Appeal of the Court's 
refusal of Defendants' Motion to Quash Writs of Execution which 
attempted to enforce execution of an amount in excess of an 
amount allowed by the judgment. That execution must be stricken 
as void, and as beyond any authority of the District Court. The 
language of the judgment is clear. It says the interest the 
Plaintiffs were seeking to add to their judgment was not per-
mitted. A specific amount was stated for interest until the 
judgment was paid. The judgment was not amended. The judgment 
must be limited by the Appeals Court to only the relief specified 
therein. 
The finality of at least part of the judgment is itself also 
open to question, as is the enforceability of the judgment. Al-
though the Court allowed a Summary Judgment, in denying the legal 
and factual arguments raised by Defendants when they filed 
motions under Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) to change the judgment, and 
for relief from judgment actually allowed, the Court permitted 
Defendants to raise at least two issues whenever the Plaintiffs 
tried to enforce the judgment. Thus, the Court should also deny 
the allowance of $4,000 in attorney fees, since a timely objec-
tion was made, but preserved for Defendants by the Court. That 
part of the judgment was not supported with notice to Defendants 
of the insufficient evidence for the fees. Similarly preserved 
was the question of enforceability of a judgment for Plaintiffs 
4 
who are also limited partners, when it is specifically contrary 
to the terms of the partnership agreement. The factual matters 
which would restrict one or both of these Plaintiffs from being 
able to sue as general creditors of the partnership, since they 
were also limited partners, were preserved to Defendants by the 
same ruling of the trial court (R 58, 9). 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE OR MUST BE 
LIMITED TO ONLY THE RELIEF SPECIFIED THEREIN. 
The judgment is m l ike other judgments. It does not allow 
interest to accrue u* til the judgment is paid. It limits the 
interest to $2,180. This limitation was built into the prayer 
and the judgment by Plaintiffs1 draftsmen. The judgment was 
never amended. Evide ce was never properly admitted to support 
the judgment which was* entered. 
I. 
WRITS OF EXECUTION IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT ALLOWED BY THE 
JUDGMENT ARE VOID AND BEYOND ANY AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The judgment allows only a specific amount for interest so 
the writs were illegal. The amount of interest allowed by this 
judgment is clearly and specifically limited to $2,180 from the 
date of judgment until the judgment is paid. The judgment does 
not allow interest to accrue, but provides a set amount until the 
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judgment is paid, using limiting language. No more interest is 
allowed. In fact, the prayer in the Complaint asked for interest 
only "until judgment*1 (R 2). The prayer, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment are all consistent with each 
other in allowing less interest than a typical judgment. 
Interest accruing until payment was neither requested nor part of 
the judgment. Though unusual, the judgment is clear on its face. 
By State Law, if a judgment is to bear interest, the 
judgment itself must recite the interest. Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. 
provides as follows: 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; . . . 
(emphasis added) 
The note was a contract. To get interest, the judgment had 
to specify it. The judgment does not allow for what the Plain-
tiffs wish it did. It specifically provides for something other 
than what the law might have allowed had the Complaint, the 
Findings and the Judgment all been prepared differently. The dif-
ference is a material one. It is not a mere failure to record a 
judgment as rendered. Plaintiffs have to accept it unless it is 
vacated and they make a timely motion for a new trial, bring a 
timely appeal, or bring a new action. It is not a clerical error 
which can be corrected under Rule 60(a). 
None of this should be surprising. If the judgment had 
allowed more, it would have allowed more than the Complaint asked 
for. Moreover, neither the present counsel for the Plaintiffs, 
6 
who entered an appearance less than three months after the 
judgment was entered, nor previous counsel, moved to amend the 
Findings of Fact or the Judgment under Rules 59 or Rule 52(b). No 
modification was requested under any other rule, either. Even 
though it is atypical and may be surprising, the judgment really 
does limit the interest. 
The omission of the language allowing interest to accrue is 
not a mere error by the Clerk which can be reformed. In Elliott 
v. Bastian, 11 Utah 452, 40 P.713 (1895), this Court would not 
permit a requested change in a judgment even six months after its 
entry because the judgment was not void on its face. Here to, the 
omission of language allowing interest is not a mere error that 
can be reformed. Although the Court entered judgment over 
Defendants' objections, those objections were preserved for them. 
However, there is no opportunity for the Plaintiffs to change it 
by ignoring its plain language and pretending it allowed more than 
it does. 
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 U.2d. 314, 471 P.2d 143 (1970) 
concludes a long list of Utah decisions dating from 1895 that 
squarely support the position that the only basis for changing the 
amount of money allowed by a judgment is for the judgment itself 
to be amended. It is often referred to for the distinction 
2 
between judicial and clerical errors. \ «j»he problem in the 
2/ Bagnall v. Suburbia Land, 579 P2d 917, 918 (Utah 1978); 
Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P2d 1146, 1149(Wyo. 1978); Laub v. South 
Central Utah Telephone, 657 P2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982); Lindsay v. 
Atkin, 680 P2d 401, 402; Bershad v. McDonouqh, 469 F2d 1333 (N.D. 
111. , 7th Cir. 1972) 
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present judgment is not clerical, from wrongly recording a 
judgment as rendered. At most it was a judicial error, from an 
error in rendering the judgment. Richards held a judicial error 
can only be cured by a timely motion for new trial, amended 
findings, appeal or a new action. Here the "error" wholly belongs 
to Plaintiffs and their counsel. The judgment entered is clear in 
limiting the interest, and is enforceable only to a certain 
amount, much less than Plaintiffs' seek. 
The writs of execution seeking enforcement of greater amounts 
are void for being in conflict with the judgment and Rule 69(b), 
which requires the writ to recite the actual amount due. Their 
issuance was an abuse of process. 
Utah has long held that judicial tribunals may not exercise 
revisionary power over adjudications after they have, in contem-
plation of the law, passed away from the Judge. See Benson v. 
Anderson, 14 U. 334, 47 P. 142 (1896). Where an effort to change 
a judgment six months later was too late. This Court also held in 
Frost et. al. v. District Court et. al. , 96 U. 106, 83 P. 2d 737 
(1938), that " . . . after the time for appeal has expired, the 
Court has no power to modify a judgment in a substantial or 
material respect. This is well-settled law," The parties there 
wanted to change a water flow priority four years after the 
judgment. The Court refused the change because it was a substan-
tive one. The judgment could not be opened or vacated. 
There was no testimony or trial of the issues in this present 
action. There was, therefore, no reason for the Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law or Judgment to allow more relief than was asked 
for in the prayer. Any explanation about what might, could or 
should have been included in the judgment does not change either 
the specific request in the Complaint, the Findings, the Con-
clusions or the Judgment. A change in the judgment cannot be made 
by Plaintiffs' presentation of writs of execution in illegal 
amounts that the Court refuses to quash. The Court's de facto 
allowance of more relief than permitted is sufficient reason to 
render the writs and judgment unenforceable to the extent of the 
excess. See Russell v. Shurtleff, 65 P.27 (Col.1901). Only that 
part of a judgment included within the prayer of the Complaint 
could be valid, and Coleman v. Meyer 483 P2d 48, 50 (Oregon,1971). 
All efforts of execution and supplemental proceeding or other 
enforcement of the judgment based on unenforceable writs should 
not only be quashed but set aside, and Defendants ought to be 
allowed damages for the Plaintiffs' abusive process where the 
writs were contrary to U.R.C.P. 69(b). Rule 69(b) requires writs 
to recite the actual amount due. Plaintiffs' writs were in error. 
The District Court lacks authority to permit issuance of illegal 
writs of execution. If Plaintiffs claim these were justified by 
an error in the judgment, the error was wholly attributable to 
Plaintiffs, was judicial in nature, and could not be cured by 
clever drafting or the Court's oversight. Defendants do not waive 
their right to have such writs stricken. 
Allowance of writs for more than the judgment has the effect 
of amending the judgment without due process of law. Such action 
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conflicts with Defendants' rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by illegally taking Defendants' property. 
Defendants were already denied procedural due process under Rule 
12(c), Rule 56(c), Rule 5(a), 48-2-13 U.C.A. and the Utah Con-
stitution when the judgment was entered over factual objections 
which should have been resolved, but which were instead preserved 
3 
by the Court. \ pQr the Court to permit writs for the wrong 
amount is to allow a judgment for other than that which was 
demanded, and deprives Defendants of their day in Court. See 
Becker v. S.P.V Construction Company, 612 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1980). 
The findings and judgment were prepared by the Plaintiffs. 
The Complaint was signed by Plaintiffs. It is illegal and unfair 
for the Court to allow enforcement of the judgment for any more 
than what was actually provided for. The judgment in fact does 
not vary from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
judgment has remained uncontested by Plaintiffs. The Court's 
acquiesence in efforts to enforce it for a greater amount makes 
the Court and the law look impotent. The Rules of Procedure and 
statutes of Utah are for everyone to follow. Defendants are 
/ Defendants' pleadings raised both factual and legal 
defenses that the Court did not address specifically and may have 
ignored, as is explained in the statement of facts. Nevertheless, 
these were preserved by the Court's order (Addendum J) for 
whenever enforcement was attempted. So the only due process 
Defendants received was the right to bring the matters up at any 
and all such times. In denying Defendants' Motion to Quash the 
writs (R 259-287), the Court ignored that promise, allowed 
Plaintiffs to issue writs contrary to the judgment, and destroyed 
Defendants' rights to due process. 
10 
entitled to rely on a Court with integrity. Anything short of 
that denies the Defendants' procedural due process, and is the 
means for Plaintiffs to take property from the Defendants without 
due process. 
II. 
"APPROPRIATE ACTION" INCLUDES DEFENDANTS' REQUEST TO SET 
ASIDE WRITS AND ALL OR PART OF THE JUDGMENT. 
Whatever was meant when the Court said the Defendants were 
entitled " . . . to take any appropriate action when the judgment 
is sought to be enforced" (R 58) should be liberally applied in 
favor of Defendants. The Court's intent which appeared so plain, 
has remained a mystery because the Court ignored its own words. 
Issues before the Court (see Statement of Facts) when the Court 
made this promise to Defendants were (1) whether a judgment should 
issue at all because of disputed facts about the partner status of 
each of the Plaintiffs; and (2) whether attorney fees were proper 
at all, particularly where Defendants had no notice of the 
affidavit in support of the request for attorneys fees. 
Inherent within the first issue are questions of whether 
U.C.A. 48-2-13 and the partnership contract restricted limited 
partners from privileges of suit in recovering a loan made to this 
partnership; and whether Mr. Barber was to be treated like Mrs. 
Barber as a limited partner. Whether either Plaintiff should be 
precluded from enforcing a judgment against general partners 
11 
because of the partnership agreement, U.C.A. 48-2-13, and the 
partnership's financial status was brought up by Defendants before 
and after the judgment (R 11, 12, 26-9, 34-5, 49-51). The basis 
for any award for attorney fees in the judgment was challenged by 
Defendants before the Court (R 51, 57). Defendants were never 
served the affidavit Plaintiffs used to justify the fee (R 23, 
57). This violated Defendants' rights under Rules 5(a), to be 
served copies of pleadings, and 56(c). After all this, Defendants 
were entitled to a reasoned response. The Court did not address 
these issues, however. Instead, the Court allowed them to be 
brought up whenever the Defendants ^ere pressed to pay the 
judgment; to wit: These issues were classified by the trial court 
as going to priorities and enforceability (R 58). 
The Court apparently considered Plaintiffs' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings (R 13) under Rule 12(c) U.R.C.P. as a 
motion for summary judgment under Rrle 56, which allows the 
parties to submit affidavits. However, the Court did not advise 
the parties the matter would be decided under Rule 56. Instead of 
filing opposing affidavits, Defendants argued the legal basis for 
the affirmative defenses, and attached copies of some of their 
evidence to support their facts. This response showed specific 
facts to be tried. (R 26-9, 34-5). Defpndants1 Motion for Relief 
under Rule 59 and other rules (R 49-51) resulted in the unique 
memorandum (R 58) and order (R 59) permitting Defendants to bring 
up all their arguments "when the judgment is sought to be 
enforced." The enforceability of the judgment was thus a question 
12 
preserved forever by the Court. At times this was honored (R 73), 
but usually it was not (R 91). The jurisdiction of the Court to 
permit any writs to be issued, in view of this language, was 
nevertheless preserved as a factual and legal question by the 
Court itself. 
Plaintiffs1 affidavit in support of attorneys fees was never 
served on the Defendants and lacks a mailing certificate. (R 23, 
57). Summary Judgment should not have been entered for the 
attorney fees. Under Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 
P2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975), even a summary judgment cannot award 
undisputed attorney fees without a stipulation, evidence of the 
actual amount, or an unrefuted affidavit. The unrefuted affidavit 
should not be considered filed since it was not served on Defen-
dants (R 23, Rule 5(a) U.R.C.P.). Even if accepted, where 
judgment was granted on the pleadings, the affidavit does not meet 
the standard that there must be evidence of the necessity and 
reasonableness of the attorney fees. 
This standard was reaffirmed by Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P2d 498 
(Utah 1976), which cites Freed at 499. This Court has said there 
must be evidence to support the reasonableness and necessity of 
attorney fees. In allowing these, the trial court abused its 
discretion because proper evidence was lacking. Mueller v. Cache 
Valley Dairy 657 P2d 1279 (Utah, 1982); Trayner v. Gushing 688 P2d 
856 (Utah, 1984 - attorney fees are limitable to appropriate 
amounts) . Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P2d 622 (Utah, 1985 - Findings 
should be made which support the award). Defendants raised the 
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point that they had no knowledge of the affidavit and opposed 
entry of a judgment for that amount (R 57). Instead of addressing 
the matters specifically, the Court allowed that subject and the 
others to be brought up later if the Plaintiffs sought to enforce 
the judgment. (R 58, 59). Defendants relied on this. 
To uphold the judgment denies due process rights under the 
United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV(l), and also 
violates Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Entry of 
judgment including the attorneys fees without serving Defendants 
with the affidavit violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a). 
The trial court that ignored this requirement also said Defendants 
could bring this matter and the others up whenever Plaintiffs 
tried to enforce the judgment (R 58). They brought it up, but the 
Court broke its promise. To the extent of those fees, the 
judgment and any writs for that amount are beyond the Court's 
jurisdiction. It was the Court that characterized all those 
claims as going to "enforceability and priority" (R 58). Since 
the Court defined Defendants' claims that way, and made that 
offer, Defendants chose not to appeal at that time, but to rely on 
the Court's offer to decide the matters later. The Court never 
did decide them. 
The other factual matter on which Defendants opposed summary 
judgment centered on the financial status of the partnership, 
partnership agreement and status of limited partner Plaintiffs, 
particularly in view of Section 48-2-13 U.C.A. which provides: 
14 
48-2-13 Loans and other business transactions 
between partnership and limited partner. (1) 
A limited partner also may lend money to, and 
transact other business with the partnership, 
and, unless he is also general partner, 
receive on account of resulting claims against 
the partnership, with general creditors, a 
pro-rata share of the assets. If, at the time 
of receipt, the assets of the partnership are 
not sufficient to discharge partnership 
liabilities to persons not claiming as general 
or limited partners, no limited partner shall 
in respect to any such claim: 
(a) Receive as collateral security any 
partnership property or, 
(k) Receive from a general partner or 
the partnership any payment, conveyance, or 
release from liability. 
(2) . . . 
(3) The . . . receiving of a payment, 
conveyance or' release in violation of the 
provisions of subsection (1) or (2) is a fraud 
on the creditor's of the partnership, 
(emphasis added) 
The foregoing clearly forbids a limited partner to receive 
any property from general partners even for a loan unless all non 
partners can be paid first. Limited partner creditors are not 
treated equally with the non-partner creditors of a partnership! 
This language puts a creditor of the partnership who happens to be 
a limited partner in a lesser position than other creditors. 
Apparently the policy is to avoid the appearance of favoring 
creditors who are limited partners. The facts which require the 
application of this statute were raised by Defendants in the 
Record at R 26-29, R 34-35; again at R 49-51 and R 56 to 57 as 
well as in the Answer, R 11, 12. Yet this point, too, was 
designated by the Court as going to priority and enforceability 
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(R 58). It was preserved for the Defendants to bring up in case 
the Plaintiffs should ever try to enforce their judgment. 
The only logical interpretation of the June 5,1979 (R 58, 59) 
order is that the Court at that time intended Plaintiffs could 
never enforce their judgment until the restrictions of Section 48-
2-13 were removed. If Plaintiffs tried to collect, the Court 
would then rule on this matter, and the others. There was no 
restriction on how long these defenses would last, but presumably 
it would be as long as the judgment lasted. The very enfor-
ceability of the judgment was thus preserved. The general 
creditors had not been paid and the Court knew this. (R 77-88). 
However, on numerous occasions the District Court has refused to 
honor its obligation and pledge to require this statute to be 
enforced, even though it had knowledge it should be. (R 91, 94-9, 
106-7, 110, 135-9, 148-9, 150-6, 166-8, 179, 189-193, 241-9, 252-
3, 287, 300). Instead, when Defendants made? motions for the Court 
to consider which went to the priority and enforceability of the 
judgment (the Court's own definition), the Court said it had 
already denied that issue, and ignored Defendants' request. The 
Court has not, however, denied those issues. It preserved them, 
like pickles, but never allowed the preserves to be opened. Its 
subsequent actions contrary to Defendants' rights are void. The 
Court never gave specific reasons for its action on these matters, 
which were plead as defenses and raised in response to the motion 
for the judgment, even when specifically raised immediately after 
the judgment. Defendants nevertheless were not foreclosed from 
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continuing to raise them anytime Plaintiffs tried to enforce the 
judgment. The amount and enforceability of the judgment are thus 
both long preserved matters, even though a judgment was entered. 
Although some points are brought up again long after the 
judgment, the Court actually preserved these rights to the Defen-
dants. This Court should decide Plaintiffs' priority and the 
enforceability of the judgment as of the time the Motion to Quash 
was made, in light of the issues raised there. The trial court 
refused to do it before. The legal questions are still alive, and 
Defendants request appropriate orders be made to require the 
setting aside of (1) writs in excess of the face amount of the 
judgment; (2) writs and judgment to the extent of the illegal and 
unsupported attorney fees; and (3) judgment to the extent the 
Court's orders were in excess of the jurisdiction allowed by 
Section 48-2-13, U.C.A. Defendants also seek attorney fees on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should not have allowed summary judgment, but 
it did. However, it left open the finality of at least part of 
that judgment, and the enforceability of all of it is open to 
question. The Court's language (R 58), allowing Defendants to 
raise forever the legal and factual arguments it said went to 
priority and enforceability should have protected the Defendants, 
who tried to rely on it. These matters were raised by the 
Defendants when Defendants filed motions under Rule 59 to change 
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the judgment and Rule 60(b) for relief from that judgment. The 
Court allowed Defendants to raise these issues whenever Plaintiffs 
tried to enforce the judgment. 
Irrespective of the finality of the judgment, the language of 
the judgment is not subject to question, and the interest that the 
Plaintiffs seek to add to the judgment is neither allowed by it 
nor can the judgment be changed to allow it now. The judgment 
must at least be limited by this Court to allow only the relief 
specified. Plaintiffs' efforts to enforce writs of execution in 
excess of the amount allowed by the judgment mxist be stricken as 
void and beyond any authority of the District Court. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1987. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ft day of May, 1987 four 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed postage 
prepaid to : 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES a KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 4 
Secretary 
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Addendum 
Parts of the Record, as follows: 
Memorandum Decision of 11/20/86 . . A 
Refusing to Quash Writ of Execution (R 287) 
Order 12/1/86 refusing to Quash Writ of B 
Execution (R 290) 
Motion to Make Additional Findings C 
11/25/86 (R 288) 
Objection to form of Order 12/2/86 (R 292). . . . D 
Reply 12/2/86 (R 294) E 
Memorandum Decision 12/16/86. Court states . . . P 
there are no provisions to make a Motion for 
Additional Findings (R 300) 
Order 12/26/86 (R 301) G 
Notice of Appeal 1/23/87, Appealing 12/1/86 . . . H 
Order and all related Orders (R 303) 
Judgment 4/18/79 (R 40,41) I 
Memorandum 5/4/79 and Order 6/5/79 denying. . . . J 
Motion to Amend Judgment where the Court 
allowed Defendants to take "any appropriate 
action when the Judgment is sought to be 
enforced" (R 58,59) 
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution 11/7/86 . . . . K 
(R 259,260) 
STATUTES: 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
Taking property without due process: 
Amendment V 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 . . . 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
Taking property without due process: 
Article I, Section 7 Attached 
Attached 
Attached 
UTAH CODE (1953) 
Section 15-1-4 - Any judgment Attached 
rendered from a lawful contract shall 
conform thereto and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, 
which shall be specified in the judgment. 
Section 48-2-13 - Limited partner . . . Attached 
who has loaned money to the partnership 
cannot receive from the partnership or 
from the general partner any payment etc. 
for the loan made if at the time the 
assets of the partnership are insufficient 
to discharge partnership liabilities. 
RULES: 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 5(a) - All pleadings must be 
served on opposing parties. 
Rule 12(c) - Motion for judgment on . 
pleadings treated as a motion for 
Summary Judgment when matters outside 
the pleadings are presented but not 
excluded. 
Rule 52(b) - Motions to amend or make 
additional findings. 
Rule 56(c) - Summary Judgment proper . 
only where uncontested issues of fact. 
Attached 
Attached 
Rule 59 - New trials amendments of . 
judgment. 
Rule 69(b) - Writ must recite actual 
amount due. 
Attached 
Attached 
Attached 
Attached 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A, 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, JR., General 
Partners, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 176 30 
Defendants have filed a Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution. 
Defendants had previously filed a Motion for Quashing a Writ 
of Execution that was issued previous to the second one. After 
an examination of the documents, writs, judgments, etc., it 
appears that this writ is the same as the other one where the 
motion was denied. 
The Court will therefore deny this one. Counsel for plaintiff 
to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this 20th day of November, 1986. 
BY T«fe COURT: 
CODY of *ho above mailed/to' ,' 
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J.08-4te.-4ferttn, Suit^i200 - Logan, Utah 84321 
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eorge. Dai 
Raymond N. ..Maleuf • i ~ ^ r O - ^ ^ t r Z W ~>Tff8riv$ 
•V* 20th - d*Y oi ~ NcWeafeer-r- 1 "• 86 f 
: H 3. LI-fcN, Cleric \
 n An ; ,J 
XHIBfr A 
;/ ^ © t t x l &• G>< >M 
BOOK 65 rw 24 
x 
CO 
it S is 
F 
• « 
s& s 
^ 
7^ 
o 
Si? CO 
GO 
* 257 
RECEIVED 
N. George Daines - 0803 
DAINES & KANE udo Utl -1 hi I- bO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff
 rv^ fi-- ...,.,*, M .—,„ 
108 North Main, Suite 20tTul - •'"•'••< -«-t^ 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
O R D E R 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN * 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
* 
Plaintiff, 
* 
vs. 
* Civil No. 17630 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. * 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, JR., general partners,* 
Defendants. * 
Defendant having made Motion to quash the Writ of Execution 
with Memorandum supporting the same, and Plaintiff having 
responded thereto, the Court thereupon entered its Memorandum 
Decision determining that after examination of documents, writs, 
judgments, etc., it appears to the Court that the Writ of 
Execution is the same as the previous one wherein this same 
Motion was denied. 
BASED THEREON, the Court therefore denies this Motion 
finding that the Writ of Execution should not be Quashed and 
Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed therewith. 
DATED this / day of November, 1986. / 
Number n fain-?/ 
DCCi 1936 
*f.^__42 Deputy EXHIBIT B **• & J ' W i j 4 
Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone:(801) 752-9380 
ESSriOV26 ' t i l l ' 39 
CI. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and 
HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et• al., 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO MAKE 
ADDITIONAL FINDENGS 
Civil No. 17630 
Come now the Defendants and move the Court to amend and or 
make additional findings to the memorandum decision dated November 
20, 1986, and to amend the Order accordingly, to wit: (1) The 
Court should find that the judgment may only be enforced in the 
total amount of $21,211.30, less payments received, which in fact 
is all the judgment allows. (2) The Court should stay enforce-
ment of the judgment until the writ is modified. 
This Motion is based on the citations and argument presented 
in Defendants1 Reply, dated November 17, 1986, which points out 
(1) the limitations of the judgment as entered in this case; (2) 
the fact that there has been no amendment to the judgment; and 
(3) decisions by the Utah Supreme Court mandating methods for 
amending a judgment. 
This Motion is brought under Rules 52(b) and 77(a); U.R.C.P. 
Defendants request appropriate relief from the proceedings Plaint-
iff is pursuing, under Rule 65B(b)(2)(4). 
Dated this ^ J^Vday of November, 1986. 
Number LU2SQL=T?7 
NOV',31986 
SETHS. AUDI, Clerk 
% - — ^ J A Deputy EXHIBIT C 
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RECEIVED 
Raymond N. Malouf/md ,nr^ |-,rp _o r\i [•: 58 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES !-;o° UL ^ ' " 
Attorney for Defendant r-r! " '".'V CLZUV 
150 East 200 North, Suite D w.„.... 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, ] 
husband and wife, , 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al., 
Defendants. .-., 
1 OBJECTION TO FORM 
I OF ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 17630 
COME NOW the Defendants under Rule of Practice 2.9 and object 
to the form of the order submitted December 1, 1986, which was 
supposed to implement the terms of the memorandum decision of 
November 20, 1986. 
Defendants object to the language at the end of the form that 
says "Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed therewith.", referring 
to the writ of execution. The court did not order that the 
Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in its memorandum decision, 
but merely refused to quash the writ. Inasmuch as there is already 
a motion to make additional findings before the court, which would 
allow the court to address the question of what amount the judgment 
actually allows to be collected. The gratuitous insertion of the 
objectionable language in the order is inappropriate. 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 1986 
RECEIVED 
m DEC -2 w * 5 8 
Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al., 
Defendants. 
REPLY 
CIVIL NO. 17630 
COME NOW the Defendants and reply to the response dated 
November 28, 1986 by Plaintiffs. 
The merits of the motion have never been ruled on. If the 
points raised by this motion have been made and denied, neither the 
court nor counsel can demonstrate where, for the record does not 
show it. The merits of the motion have never been specifically 
ruled on by the court. That is why the motion for additional or 
amended findings was made. 
Dated this 2nd day of D^ ceffiT5erT"1986. 
Number _ / 7 / ^ ^Q-./CO 
% : 
nrr> 1986 
SCTHS. ALIEN, C/erft 
' • ^ Deputy 
EXHIBIT E 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP 
and VON K. STOCKIMG, DON A. 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND 
N. MALOUF, general partners 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 176 30 
Defendant has filed a motion to make additional findings. 
The Court knows of no provision for such a motion. Therefore 
denies the same. 
As to the objection to the form of the order, the Court 
feels this has already been ruled upon and therefore denies the 
objection. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this 16th day of December, 19 86. 
BY mk 
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_oay ut io £uave nwiifca to. , * , \ 
George Da£n.ea..~vlQfi No.'Main, Suite 200 - Logan, Utah 84321 
Raymond..a>..Ma&wf-~-'j.50• Ba^-affi-Scr, Suite P - Logan, Utah 84321 
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SETH 5. ALLEN, Otk 
Deputy
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CACHE COUHTY CliU 
N. George Daines - 0803 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, general partners, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 17630 
Defendant has filed a Motion to Make Additional Findings and 
Objection to Form of the Order. The Court having received the 
response of the Plaintiff, now enters its order denying the 
Motion to Make Additional Findings determining that the same is 
not a proper motion. The Court also denies the objection to the 
form of the Order having determined that this objection has 
already been ruled upon. 
DATED this %-k day of December, 1986. 
Number aBLLo'f 
BY THE COURT 
A 
4*. 
f
- ^ 2 6 foot 
&1H S. Aupi, Clerfc 
District Judge 
Deputy 
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Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CIVIL NO, 17630 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendants hereby appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the order entered in this 
action on December 1, 1986, which was based on a memorandum 
decision of November 20, 1986, against which Defendant's Rule 
52(b) motion was filed November 26, 1986, which 52(b) motion was 
denied by order filed December 26, 1986, less than 30 days 
preceeding this Notice of Appeal, and from all related, underlying 
or preceeding orders related thereto which have also been pre-
served by the Court or the parties for appeal. 
DATED this $*^dav o f January, 1987. 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
umber / 7/£. ?/?- J A •9 Raymond 
Attorney ^or Appellant/DefendaA/t 
JAN ? 3 '36? 
* - > tt{' Deputy 
EXHIBIT H 
303 
MAitms pffcsroN * G U T K C 
ATTO.NCVS AT LAW 
V.OOAM. UTAH M l t l 
' H O N ! 7S I1SSI 
B. H. HARRIS 
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephones 752-3551 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo™— 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JUDGEMENT 
Civil No, 17630 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, 
Defendants. 
——oooOooo 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Court 
without a jury on the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgement on the 
Pleadings. The affidavits and memorandum having been submitted 
to the Court by the parties and the Court having entered its 
Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of April, 1979, and based 
thereon, the Court having made and filed herein its Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law and based thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the PMntiffs 
have recovered judgement against the Defendants in the amount due 
on a promissory note in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (§15,000.00 
Dollars plus accrued interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum 
from date hereof until paid in the amount of Twenty-one Hundred 
Eighty ($2,180.00) Dollars, attorney fees in the amount of 
Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars and court costs in the amount 
Humbsr / 7 k ^ - ' ? £ -jl** 
of Thirty-one and 30/100 ($31.30) Dollars. l<T] 
PLED APR i: 1979 AfrkS 
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EXHIBIT I 
BOOK \ \ ?kil\0cl $ 
HARRIS PRESTON » G U T K C 
ATTORMKYS AT LAW 
I I r i O K R A L A V C N U K 
LOOAN UTAH M1SI 
CMONf Tta I I I 1 
DATED t h i s I? 
• 2 -
day o f A p r i l , 1 9 7 9 , 
/ 
/ 
DIST1 IICT rJUOGE 
- w * 
PHICT' JWGI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Judgement to Raymond N« Malouf of MALOUF & MALOUF, 
Attorney for Defendants, 21 West Center, Logan, Utah 84321, this 
( 
day of April, 1979. 
^ crr^^^Q f/0 F'fe '~s H<*( 
<£ " * 
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J 
41 BOOK 41 d02S 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER, E t a l , 
P l a i n t i f f 
v s . 
* 
* 
* 
C i v i l No. 17630 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
THE EMPORIUM, Etal, 
Defendants 
Defendant has filed a Motion ±>r Amendment to the Judgment, 
Relief from Judgment and Stay of Execution. Generally the 
thrust of defendants' argument goes to questions of how the 
judgment should be enforced and priorities in connection 
therewith. 
Therefore, defendants' motion is denied, of course, 
without prejudice to take aay appropriate action when the 
judgment is sought to be er forced. 
Counsel for plaintiff is requested to prepare the 
appropriate order. 
Dated this 21st day of May, 19 79. 
*
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jl.lZtHMrikjrfJJ![jFederal jWe^ Jafl&ac UT 84321 
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HARRIS PRESTON * C U T K E 
ATTOMNKVS-ATlAW 
I I r C O K R A L A V K N U C 
LOGAN, UTAH M i l l 
PMONt 711 I t l l 
B. H. Harris 
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3' Federal Avenue 
Logan. Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-3551 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
General Partners. 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT, RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT AND STAY 
ON EXECUTION 
Civil No. 17630 
Defendants having filed a motion for Amendment to Judgment, 
Relief from Judgment and Stay on Execution in the above entitled 
matter and the Court having issued its memorandum decision on 
May 21, 1979, and based thereon, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant4 
motion is hereby denied without prejudice to take any 
appropriate action when the judgment is sought to be" enforced. 
DATED th i s c£ — d a y o f j f i ? , 1 9 7 9 . 
^ > V 3 P - > r 
rHlBIT 3 
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Raymond N. Malouf/dh (5:EMBAMTQW.RDP) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752:9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and 
HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs MOTION TO QUASH 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PART-
NERSHIP, et. al., 
Defendants Civil No. 17630 
Come now the Defendants and move that a defective and fraudu-
lent Writ of Execution which Plaintiffs caused to be issued over 
the seal of this Court October 8, 1986 be quashed, and that all 
proceedings, process, execution and advertising efforts flowing 
from said writ be rescinded, cancelled, set aside and terminated 
immediately and Plaintiffs be ordered to terminate all proceedings 
under said writ. 
The Writ is defective because it is not. in conformity with 
Rule 69(b) U.R.C.P. which requires that the Writ recite the amount 
actually due on the judgment. The writ is fraudulent because the 
judgment specifically does not support the amount claimed to be 
due* 
*j. The Writ of Execution recites there is $39,369.33 due. On 
^ £> July 18, 1986, the Plaintiff caused a Writ of Execution regarding 
^ \this same judgment to be issued which showed a total amount due of 
25L A 
*S Vj$21,232.80. The Plaintiffs caused a Partial Satisfaction of 
. uudgment to enter October 7, 1986 showing $866.47 was paid 
3E December 31, 1982. It is obvious that the Writ of Execution 
cf> j^ ssued October 8, 1986 is inconsistent with prior writs. It 
F^urther is not in conformity with the specific language of the 
EXHIBIT K ss9 
Judgment that says the total amount due is the principal "plus 
accrued interest until paid in the amount of $2,180..." (emphasis 
added). The language is parallel to the language in the Findings 
of Fact, the Conclusions and the prayer of the Complaint. 
Interest cannot be added because of the limitations of the 
judgment. 
The Judgment has jzert been challenged by the Plaintiff since 
its entry April 18th, 1979. The Judgment provides for a specific 
amount of interest to be allowed on the principal in the amount 
set forth, from the date of judgment "until paid." The language 
in the judgment is in conformity with the prayer in the Complaint. 
No more is allowed by the judgment. 
The Writ of Execution seeks for more damages than the 
judgment allows. There is no justifiable legal basis for Plain-
tiffs to gratitously interpret.the judgment in their favor. There 
is no authority for Plaintiffs to now attempt to fraudulently 
obtain satisfaction of the judgment for more than the judgment 
allows by using a defective writ. At no time previously have 
Plaintiffs attempted to represent in pleadings filed in this Court 
that there was more money due in total than the judgment allows on 
its face, until the Plaintiff's October 8, 1986 writ of execution. 
This is a fraud upon the Court and Defendants, an abuse of pro-
cess, and defective. 
May 21st, 1979 the Court's Memorandum Decision signed by the 
Judge provided that the Defendants were entitled to take any 
appropriate action when the judgment is sought to be enforced. To 
quash this writ of execution is an appropriate action to take. 
DATED this _^  day of November, 1986. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Attorney for Defendants 
PYUffifTv 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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CONSTITUTION OF TH» UNITED 8TATBS AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ART. I, §7 
Section 7. 
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as cm 
other Bills. . , 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House * * p ^ u ^ " J 
the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President 
ART. I, §8 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall 
return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have origi-
nated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed 
to reconsider i t If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House 
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, 
to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if ap-
proved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such 
Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and 
the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered 
on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned 
by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have 
been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he 
had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, 
in which Case it shall not be a Law. 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United 
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, 
or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations pre-
scribed in the* Case of a BilL 
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15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in th« 
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annnnj 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, ft 11; C.L. 1907, Cross-Reference*. — Interest to be ia-
\^lJ?\C;h l?!Z\ * ^ J , 1 ^ 1 9 3 3 * C' c l u d e d in judgment entry, Rule* of Civil r W 1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, i 2. dure, Rule 64(e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment increased the interest rate from 8% to 
12%. 
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LIMITED PAJtTNE&SHIP 48-2-14 
48-2-13. Loans and other buaineM transaction* between partner-
ship and limited partner. (1) A limited partner also may lend money 
to, and transact other business with the partnership, and, unless he is also 
a general partner, receive on account of resulting claims against the part-
nership, with general creditors, a prorata share of the assets. If, at the 
time of receipt, the assets of the partnership are not sufficient to discharge 
partnership liabilities to persons not claiming as general or limited part-
ners, no limited partner shall in respect to any such claim: 
(a) Receive as collateral security any partnership property or, 
(b) Receive from a general partner or the partnership any payment, 
conveyance, or release from liability. 
(2) Without prior written full disclosure to all limited partners of the 
terms and the collateral involved in a proposed loan by a limited partner, 
no limited partner shall make a loan upon the security of partnership 
property if, at the time such loan is made, the assets of the partnership 
are not sufficient to discharge partnership liabilities to persons not claim-
ing as general or limited partners. 
(3) The making of a secured loan, or the receiving of collateral security, 
or a payment, conveyance or release in violation of the provisions of sub-
jection (1) or (2) is a fraud on the creditors of the partnership. 
History: L 1921, ch. 88, § 13; R.S. 1933 k former subsec. (2) as (3); inserted "The mak-
C1943,69-2-13; L1975, ch. 139,11. ing of a secured loan, or" at the beginning of 
^ « . w «
 M a t M wk*- (3); substituted "subsection (1) or (2)" 
%J , ™ A • • .A »u . . . f o r "P*wsph d r in subsec. (3); and made 
The 1975 amendment inserted If
 m i ^^^^ jn p , ^ ^ ^ punctua-
general or limited partners" at the beginning ^ r \ ^ 
of the second sentence of subsec. (1); deleted \ 
If at the time the assets of the partnership CalUtMrml R*fM*iicaa. \ 
are not sufficient to discharge partnership *" ,M»W« ummnm**-
 x ^ c 
liabilities to persons not claiming as general Partnership *=» 366. , 
or limited partners" st the end of subd. 68 CJS Partnership 1471. ' 
(1Mb); inserted subsec. (2); redesignated 60 AmJur 2d 266, Partnership i 385. 
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Key Numbers. — Corporation* •» 607; 6S, 63,64, S2.S4 to 111, 127 to 163; 161 to 166; 
Counties •» 219; Drains e» 20; Municipal Cor- Schools and School Districts *» 119; States e» 
porations *» 1029; Process •» 21, 23, 24, 50 to 204; Waters and Water Courses *» 179. 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written notice other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the orooertv at the time of its seizure. 
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Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent,to such a motion bv Rule 56 
UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 52 
(b) Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
•otry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
luch findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
Rule 56c Summary judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genome issue as to the amount of damages. 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
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UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with -reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate dar ages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence i justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for \ new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 dnyB after the entry of the jidgmont. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
•pecify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Mottan to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall bo Horviui not In tor thnn 10 day* alter entry of th<> judgment. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 69 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu-
must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of 
ourt and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any 
„y in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) 
(rhere it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it 
be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
of is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal 
rty, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the 
lent, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, 
ames of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount 
3f, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the 
f of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real 
rty, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms 
writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment 
generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with 
st, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal 
-ty cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
st, out of his real property. 
le judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall 
such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to 
e the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in confor-
herewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the 
ent to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the 
ent was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by 
obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court. 
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